In this paper we explore what impact, if any, government debts have on achieving the Millennium Development Goals for the Indian states. To fulfill the goals, national governments, especially in the developing world, have to undertake major investments in the social sector; but how much they will really be able to do so will depend on the conditions of their finances. For the Indian states we find that government investment in the social sector is extremely important to reduce poverty, but the government's debt burden is actually stopping several states from attaining the MDG targets. Although, in the medium term the impact of the debt on poverty is not very harmful, in the longer run it has a significant negative impact. Therefore for policy purposes reduction in debt should be given a priority.
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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to explore what impact, if any, government debts have on achieving the poverty target of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for the Indian states. The MDGs specify the target levels to be achieved for a set of specific indicators by 2015. By addressing a broad range of indicators such as income poverty, health, literacy, gender, environment, with strong interlinkages between them, the UN general assembly which ratified the MDGs, hoped to bring about a reduction in the overall level of deprivation in the world (UN 2000) . The goals are ambitious. Among others it calls for halving of poverty, illiteracy, and infant mortality by 2015. 1 This, however, also means that to fulfill the goals, national governments, especially in the developing world, have to undertake major investments in the social sector. But how much they will really be able to do, will depend on the conditions of their finances, which therefore, indirectly determine the success of the MDGs.
Taking government debt as one of the indicators of their financial condition, in this paper we look into the ability of governments for increased and sustained expenditure in the social sectors. Typically one would presume that large government debts are incurred in subsidizing health or education programmes or direct poverty eradication programmes. Therefore, an increased government debt would reflect an increased involvement of the government in such programmes. Thus higher debt will alleviate poverty.
This, however, is not at all obvious. If interest payments on debts are high, a country may easily slip in to a debt trap, where it is incurring larger debts just to be able to pay its previous debts. Higher debt may persuade governments to reduce some of their social programmes which may have directly benefitted the poor. In such circumstances debt will increase poverty. In 1 this paper we explore this issue of how debt effects poverty in greater detail.
Given the large concentration of poor and deprived in South Asia, the performance of this region becomes crucial to the achievements of the MDGs (World Bank 2006) . In India, which is the largest country in the region, due to the federal nature of the political system, the constitution separates the responsibilities of the centre and the states. The centre and the states each have a list of areas which are under their direct control and there is also a concurrent list for which both the centre and the states are responsible. 2 Most of the MDGs fall under the concurrent list or the state list. Hence, for our study we have focussed on the Indian states. Moreover, given the differences between the states in India, both in terms of economic growth and quality of life indicators, such state level analysis provides a more realistic base to study the progress towards the MDGs.
In studying poverty in India, therefore, it is important to assess the state governments' role and capabilities. For the Indian states, in a series of papers Besley and Burgess (2000) , Besley and Burgess (2004) , Burgess and Pande (2005) have discussed how institutional environments, business climate and access to finance impact poverty, however, the role of government finances in poverty reduction has not been studied so far. In this paper we will assess both the direction and the magnitude of the effects of debt on poverty and place it in the context of having sustainable poverty reduction in the long run and thus achieving the MDG with respect to poverty. For instance, according to news reports (The Telegraph, 19 November, 2004) West Bengal, relatively a medium level state in terms of its achievements, spends around 46 per cent of its total receipts including tax, non-tax and loan receipts, to service debts. Its expenditure on salary, pensions and loan repayments is more than 100 per cent of its total revenue. 3 Obviously, this does not leave much room for development related expenditures. In a more rigorous study of the public sector debts in India, Kochar (2004) notes that 'India has among the most largest and most intractable fiscal imbalances in the world'. Rangarajan and Srivastava (2003) recommend a reduction in the level of the primary deficits so that over all the debt can be sustainable.
In fact taking account of hidden subsidies and future commitments by the various state governments, the debt burden takes on a serious magnitude notwithstanding the assets of the governments. In their study comparing Indian government finances with other emerging markets, Roubini and Hemming (2004) finds that India faces a higher risk of a debt crisis due to its huge debt burden. Recognizing the gravity of the issue and its potential to create severe macroeconomic imbalances, the Twelfth Finance Commission of India has recommended a radical restructuring of the state level debts to reduce the overall debt burden (Bagchi 2005; Kurian 2005 ).
Although there are several dimensions of the MDGs, we have chosen to study income poverty in particular. Apart from its importance within the MDGs, it is also one of the most studied indicators for the Indian states.
Further, detailed data on poverty for each state has been collected for all states in India for several years. However, we should point out that the methodology used in this paper can be equally applied to study the impact of government debt on any other MDG indicators. The plan of our paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss the data and the methodology that we will use. Section 3 is about the results and the analysis. Section 4, 3 Bengal on the Verge of Debt trap. The Telegraph, 8 February, 2005. 3 discusses some simulation results and the final section highlights the main implications of the results.
Debt and MDGs
The literature describing how debt and the MDGs are related, is limited.
Not all of the MDGs will be affected by the government's fiscal policy. For instance, government debt may not have any bearing on the goal of achieving gender equality in both primary and secondary education, but it will certainly affect the goal of halving poverty and hunger, achieving universal education and reducing child mortality by two thirds. Any goal that may require a government to pour in resources will be affected by the conditions of the government's finances. Given our interest on the goal of halving poverty, we look at how debt affects economic growth since economic growth plays an important role in poverty reduction.
There are several channels through which debt can impact economic growth. First, higher debt increases the possibility of higher taxes in the future, which in turn dampens long term investments. Investors may divert resources to short term investment and may hold back on any current investment. This can lead to a case of reduced efficiency along with a lower level of investment (Bräuninger, 2002) . All these may cause 'debt overhang' where the states ability to honour its future debt commitments may be lower than its actual debt. In turn, this may create an environment of economic uncertainty and the possibility of capital flight increases substantially, leading to a decrease in growth and hence in poverty alleviation. The empirical evidence on debt overhang, however, remains inconclusive. 4 On the other hand, under a Keynesian approach, debt can have a positive impact on growth by generating demand and creating employment. This is particularly apt for developed countries under depression. How much this theory is applicable to developing countries, where the problem is not just the lack of demand, is arguable. Although the causal direction between debt and economic growth may be difficult to establish, economic theory also predicts that higher public debt lowers savings and thus increases interest rates. The increased interest rates then reduce growth through a reduction in investments. Kochar (2004) shows that public debt in India has been financed through private savings. This has allowed India to avoid significant external imbalances and inflationary pressures but has forced the government to offer an interest rate much higher than the market, thus making the public debt even more unsustainable. A higher debt also leads to reduction in the availability of credit for private investments and given that private investments are more efficient, this reduces the overall level of growth (Easterly 2004) .
When it comes to debt and poverty, apart from the indirect impact of debt on poverty through economic growth, there is also the direct effect when governments with high debt curtail their social expenditures. For instance, IMF (2000) shows that for many of the highly indebted poor countries, a reduction in their debts has led to an increase in social expenditure that in addition to health and education includes spending on basic sanitary infrastructure, water supply and rural development. The direct impact of debt on social expenditure crucially affects the MDGs since most of the goals implicitly rely on government investments. For instance, to ensure universal primary education, the government needs to expand schools, hire more teachers and provide teaching tools; all these require substantial investment in education. Similarly, to reduce child mortality and achieve improvement in maternal health, governments in developing countries have to undertake more investment in the health care sector. If higher debt reduces such investments, clearly then, it affects the achievements of the goals. In India with increased debt, the social expenditure decreased from 6.7 per cent in 1990-91 to 5.2 per cent in 2004-05 (Ghosh 2005) . Typically, many of the government social expenditures are availed by the poor who lose out most when expenditures are curtailed. Reduction in government involvement in these areas may prompt more private sector investment but the poor may be priced out of availing from such services.
Further, as Kochar (2004) argues, the increased public debt in India has led to a change in the composition of revenue expenditures. A higher proportion of government revenue is going towards financing the debt. Governments investment in infrastructure has reduced and in turn has led to a slow down in economic growth. Lahiri (2003) shows that the level of debt in India is high compared to international standards and discusses the reasons behind the persistence of debt and how it impedes fiscal reforms. Kochar (2004) goes on to summarize that such increased levels of public debt has lead to a reduction in growth potential 'through deterioration in the quality of public expenditure, limitations on the room for macroeconomic policy maneuver and on the scope for further structural reforms and liberalization'.
Methodology
Our aim here is to understand whether debt does help or hinder the achievement of the MDGs poverty target. We proceed in two steps. For the first step, since we have a panel data set, we run both the fixed effects and the random effects regressions. The fixed effect regression that we estimate is
where α i captures the state specific effects, p it is the poverty head count ratio for state i in year t, X it is a vector of explanatory variables such as government debt, per capita health expenditure, per capita income and per capita electricity consumption. d t is a year dummy which takes into account year specific effects. u it is the error term. Similarly the random effects regression is as follows
where ε i v N (0, σ 2 ε ) represents the state specific random effects. In this paper our interest lies in estimating the impact of debt on poverty reduction. Even if one finds a positive association between debt and poverty (that is, higher debt increases poverty) it still does not reflect causality from debt to poverty since an increased poverty may have lead to an increased debt. Additionally, this may raise an issue of endogeneity, since it is possible that debt itself may be effected by the poverty. It is important here to distinguish between fiscal deficit and debt. Although higher poverty in the current period may increase the deficit through more government expenditure to combat poverty, this increased deficit will lead to an increased government debt only in the future. Therefore, the current period poverty and current period debt are not directly related and hence issues of endogeneity does not arise. However, in modelling the causal direction from debt to poverty, we have used evidence from the literature (Kochar, 2004) . The next step is to use the estimated equation to derive the impact of debt on poverty. We use the following equation,
where b p iT is the predicted level of poverty in time T , α * i β * are estimated coefficients (derived from equations (1) or (2)), and b X iT represents the trend levels of the explanatory variables at T . For our purposes we consider T = 2007 and T = 2015.
Data
The main data that we use to estimate equations (1) and (2) 
Results and Analysis
In order to estimate the factors that effect poverty, we consider several possible models each with different control variables. The results here are based on a panel data for 25 Indian states for 1993-94 and 1999-2000. Table   1 shows the results which are estimated using a random effects model. We 9 also calculate the Breusch-Pagan test to check for the validity of the models.
We will consider the fixed effect estimation later.
[Insert Table 1 .]
The first column in Table 1 shows the regression of the log of the head count ratio on the log of debt ratio. The negative and significant time dummy implies that there is a decreasing trend in poverty, i.e. over time poverty is decreasing in the Indian states. Also, the coefficient of the log of the debt ratio is significant and positive, which implies that increased debt will increase poverty. This result is not very obvious. Higher debt can also mean lower poverty through higher employment from increased government expenditure. However, clearly the poor are not benefitting from any increased government debt. One explanation for such an occurrence may be that for many of the states, expenditure on salaries, pensions and loan payments is already close to 100 per cent of revenue. Further increase in debt is resulting from expenditure that is not necessarily targeted at the poor. This trend decrease in poverty holds true for all the models in Table   1 . Compared to other single explanatory variable models, such as Models 2 and 3, Model 1 has a higher R 2 . The Breusch-Pagan test confirms that the random error model may be appropriate in this case.
The second column in Table 1 shows the regression of the log of the head count ratio on the log of per capita health expenditure. The coefficient of the log of the per capita health is highly significant and negative indicating that as health expenditure is increased poverty will be reduced. It provides an argument for continuing and increased government investment in the social sector. The Breusch-Pagan test show that the random effect model is appropriate. In column 3, we run the same regression but with per capita real GSDP as the control variable. The coefficient is negative and significant. In fact, if the regression is run without the time dummy, the elasticity is close to one. Note also that the reduction in poverty through income growth is almost twice that from increased government expenditure in the social sector.
The next column controls for both log of health expenditure and log of the debt ratio. The coefficient of both the log of the debt ratio and the log of the health expenditure is significant. However, the coefficient of log of health expenditure is negative and the coefficient of the log of the debt ratio is positive. This implies that after controlling for social expenditure, as the debt burden increases, poverty also goes up. But an interesting difference between Model 1 and Model 4 is that the elasticity of debt ratio on poverty is higher in Model 1, which implies that once the level of health expenditure is controlled, increase in debt just increases poverty at a higher rate.
Column 5 takes into account per capita GSDP in addition to log of health expenditure and log of the debt ratio. The coefficient of both the log of the debt ratio and the log of the health expenditure is significant with a positive and negative sign respectively. But unlike other studies we find that coefficient of the per capita GSDP, though positive, is insignificant. It shows that at least for the Indian states, after controlling for health expenditure, increase in income does not make a significant dent on poverty. This brings to the fore the role of government expenditure in tackling poverty.
Column 6 which controls for log of per capita electricity consumption along with log of per capita health expenditure and log of the debt ratio,
shows that the elasticity of both electricity consumption and health expenditure are significant and negative whereas debt is insignificant. If we consider per capita electricity consumption to be proxy for mechanization and therefore higher productivity, then with a greater increase in electricity we should see a reduction in poverty. It may be that government debt is resulting from spending in infrastructure and once we take that into account, the impact of debt becomes insignificant. However, note that in this case the Breusch-Pagan test rejects the random effects model at 5 per cent level of significance. Table 2 shows the fixed effect estimation for the same regressions as in Table 1 .
[Insert Table 2 .]
It is clear from Table 2 that most of the results are similar to the random effects model in Table 1 . In the fixed effects case, health expenditure reduces poverty, higher debt increases poverty. Also, we see (Model 11) that log of per capita GSDP is insignificant when we control for both log of the debt ratio and log of per capita health expenditure. There are, however, several notable differences between Tables 2 and 1. Interestingly in Model 9, in contrast to the random effect models, the per capita GSDP is positive but insignificant, indicating that GSDP per capita may have a limited role in reducing poverty. Another difference lies in the higher debt elasticity of poverty under the fixed effect than the random effect model. Within the fixed effect models, the debt elasticity of poverty is more than twice that of other variables such as GDP per capita or health expenditure. Further, the debt elasticity of poverty is greater than one, which shows that an increase in debt more than increases poverty. Clearly, debt is not being incurred to undertake programmes to combat poverty; instead it is being used in a manner that exacerbate poverty. Hence, debt will be a dominating factor effecting poverty. Interestingly for the fixed effect models, the time trend is not always significant, which shows that once we take the state specific effects into account, the time effects may not be that important. Thus inter state differences matter more than differences over time. Further there is also a difference between the two tables between Model 6 and Model 12.
For the random effects model, log of debt ratio became insignificant when we controlled for log of per capita electricity consumption, whereas in the fixed effects case it is the opposite. While log of debt ratio is significant here, the log of per capita electricity consumption becomes insignificant.
Although we have not reported the results here, unlike other studies,
we have found that literacy does not have a significant impact on poverty, especially in the presence of log per capita health expenditure.
MDG: 2007 and 2015
We choose the random effects estimation of Model 1, Model 2 and Model 4, to deduce the impact of debt on achieving the MDG with respect to poverty.
Model 4 is chosen because it is the most parsimonious model with a good fit.
Models 1 and 2 on the other hand will give us good comparative scenarios, by
showing the effects of debt and health expenditure respectively, on poverty.
Broadly, we can then discuss two cases: one, the impact of government investment in the social sector on poverty and two, the impact on poverty as such when we take into account government debt. Model 1 will be useful to compare the effect of debt on poverty, when we do not control for social expenditures. Tables 3 and 4 per cent of India's population. Note, however, our estimated equation is based on a larger number of states. First we discuss Table 3 .
[Insert Table 3 One of the surprises in our empirics is the failure of Punjab and Gujarat, which are generally deemed to be the richer states, to meet the MDG targets.
In a broader sense one may question why some of the 'better' states such as Gujarat, Punjab are not able to meet their MDG targets whereas the poorer states such as Assam, and Orissa are able to do so. The answer to some extent lies in our modelling structure. Since we are using log linear models, it implies that states with already low levels of poverty will need to put in more in terms of their investing in health and lowering of debt to reduce poverty than states with high levels of poverty. Hence we see a dramatic decline in poverty for the poorer states. However, this also means that over time as the level of poverty comes down it will become difficult to achieve further reductions in poverty. This is highlighted in Table 4 , which provides the same information as in Table 3 but for 2015.
[Insert Table 4 .]
Considering Model 4 (column 6) eight out of the sixteen Indian states will clearly not be able to meet the MDGs, although on an average India will meet the MDG targets. While in 2007 the predicted poverty was lower than the targeted poverty by three percentage point, by 2015, the difference reduces, to less than one and half percentage points. Interestingly, the average poverty predicted by just the debt ratio (Model 1) is greater than that predicted by just taking health expenditure (Model 2). Since the health expenditure elasticity of poverty is lower than that of debt and despite that we see that poverty is lower under health, it implies that the by 2015 the trend decrease in debt ratio is lower than the trend increase in health expenditure. In other words, failure to reduce government debt is impeding the reduction of poverty, although for all the three models the predicted poverty from column 3 show that they will not be able to meet their MDGs for poverty but in our calculations they will be able to fulfill the targets. It is interesting to note that since the trend poverty rates are predicted using a linear model, the differences between the MDG targets and the poverty targets carry through for both 2007 and 2015.
Simulation
Our predicted levels of poverty depended on the forecasted levels of debt and health expenditure. The forecasts were done by fitting a linear trend on a longer time series of these variables. However, it is quite probable that the forecasts will not match with the realized values, especially when the forecast period gets longer. Therefore in this section we discuss the predicted levels of poverty for 2015 based on Model 4, under different scenarios of debt and health expenditure. In particular we consider four cases each for debt ratio and health expenditure levels. In Table 5 we consider the cases where the debt ratio increases (and decreases) by 10 per cent and 25 per cent from the trend values, with the health expenditure remaining unchanged at the trend levels.
[Insert Table 5 .]
As is obvious, an increase in debt ratio will take the Indian states further away from achieving the MDG poverty targets. Note that in 2015, given the trend levels of debt ratio and health expenditure, the Indian states on average will only just be able to reduce poverty by half. Hence, increasing the debt ratio will make that task even harder. But more interestingly a reduction of the debt ratio by 10 per cent from the trend values still does not reduce poverty to within the MDG target for the states which fail to meet the 2015 target. On the other hand with a 25 per cent decrease in the debt ratio, on average these states will come close to achieving the MDG targets although the goal remains unattainable for Bihar, Haryana and Rajasthan.
Therefore, a significant reduction in debt will help more states realise the MDG goals.
Next we perform the same exercise for health expenditure levels. Using
Model 4, we predict the level of poverty in 2015, when health expenditure is changed (increased and decreased) by 10 and 25 per cent. The results are reported in Table 6 .
[Insert Table 6 .]
As expected higher health expenditure reduces poverty. But even with a 25 percent increase in the health expenditure levels, 5 out of the sixteen Indian states fail to meet the goals. On the other hand a 25 per cent decrease in the health expenditure will stop ten states from fulfilling the MDG's, the highest in terms of the number of failed states under the different scenarios.
However, less states will be able to meet the MDG target with a 25 per cent increase in health expenditure (as in Table 6 ) compared to the number of states that fulfill the goals when the debt ratio is decreased by 25 per cent (Table 5 ). The differences in the numbers are not large, with Gujarat and West Bengal being the only state which is switching under the two conditions, i.e. it fulfills the goals under a 25 per cent decrease in debt ratio but not under a 25 per cent increase in health expenditure.
Further comparing Table 5 and Table 6 , the impact of debt on achieving MDG is clear. A 10 percent fall in the debt ratio decreases poverty by more than that achieved by a 10 percent increase in health expenditure. A 25 percent decrease in debt ratio does more to lower poverty than an increase in health expenditure by a similar percentage. Although there are states which does not achieve the MDG targets under any of the scenarios that we discussed, there is a considerable variation in the number of states that satisfy the MDG target by 2015. Out of the sixteen states the number of states that achieve the target varies between thirteen and six. But still some broad patterns emerge. In general, all the southern states in India, Andhra Pradesh Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu will definitely achieve the MDG targets. On the flip side, the northern states such as Rajasthan
Haryana and Bihar would consistently fail to satisfy the targets. Orissa and West Bengal are the two states where deterioration in the debt ratio over time makes it difficult for them to achieve the MDG target by 2015.
Conclusion
Our objective in this paper was to investigate whether government debts in India impact the ability to achieve the MDGs. The results show that debt is a hindrance to the achievement of the MDG poverty targets. We find strong evidence that government investment in the social sector is extremely important to reduce poverty, but government debt burden is actually stopping several states from attaining the MDGs. Increasing both debt and health expenditure by similar percentage points will lead to an increase in overall poverty, since debt's marginal impact on increasing poverty is more than health's impact on reducing poverty. Clearly then, a strategy of increasing debt to fund health and other social expenditures may not be a sensible policy from the point of view of reducing poverty. Also as we had observed in Table 5 and 6, a 25 percent decrease in debt ratio will help more states achieve the goal than in the case of 25 percent increase in health expenditure. Therefore for policy purposes reduction of debt should be of crucial importance.
We should point out that our model is based on a panel data of twenty five states over just two years. A richer data set may yield different results.
We took health expenditures as the main indicator for social expenditures by the government but a more comprehensive measure may be a better 
